From Framework to Mechanism: The Case for Energy-Security Obligations in ASEAN
Southeast Asia's petroleum-sharing agreement is voluntary, and the March 2026 Hormuz shock showed why it must become binding
Southeast Asia entered the March 2026 Hormuz crisis with no functioning emergency response mechanism. The region relied on a seventeen-year-old framework, which was voluntary and not fully ratified by all subscribing states to the ASEAN. The region imports approximately 56% to 60% of its crude oil from West Asia, alongside roughly one-third of its natural gas requirements. Analysis from CASE for Southeast Asia shows that Brent crude oil prices surged 59% within a single month, climbing past the $115 per barrel mark. For states such as Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines and Indonesia it was a situation that demanded unilateral responses which were not limited to diesel subsidies, biofuel mandates but fell short of coordinated regional action.
This remains crucial for contextualizing the need for a binding mechanism within the region. According to the IEA’s Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2026, the region accounts for 9% of the global population and is projected to account for close to a fifth of global demand growth through 2035. Installed coal capacity within the region reached 121 gigawatts in 2025, while clean-energy investment sat at a mere $47 billion, a fraction of what is required to transition from hydrocarbons. The region is moving deeper into import dependency, not away from it.
The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Petroleum Security (APSA) is the region’s primary collective energy security instrument, based upon the original 1986 Manila Agreement on the same. The renewed version, signed in Cha-am, Thailand, introduced the “10% critical shortage” rule: a member state experiencing a deficit of at least 10% of its normal domestic petroleum requirement for thirty or more consecutive days may notify the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE) and request emergency assistance from oil-exporting members. The agreement entered into force in March 2013, following the deposit of the tenth ratification.
STAGE | TRIGGER / ACTION |
Declaration of Distress | Member State informs the ASCOPE Secretariat of a 10% petroleum shortfall sustained for 30+ consecutive days. |
CERM Activation | Coordinated Emergency Response Measures are activated; the ASEAN Centre for Energy collects data for indicative supply commitments |
Voluntary Supply | Oil exporting countries may supply on a voluntary, commercial basis, with no binding obligations to do so. |
Dispute Resolution | Disagreements are referred to the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on ‘Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ |
In October 2025, during the 43rd ASEAN Ministers Meeting on Energy, the APSA was renewed and expanded its ambit to include natural gas along with petroleum, a crucial and welcome change, since the region is set ahead to become a net gas importer within the coming years. Yet, the foundational flaw remains within both energy tracks, being voluntary and commercial. As of the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, ratification of the framework remained incomplete. Secretary General Dr. Kao Kim Hourn elevated the issue to a political priority and expressed confidence it could be completed before the 49th Summit but declined to set a hard deadline.
Comparison with other agreements shows what a binding regional energy-security obligation actually requires. The IEA’s collective response system, and the EU’s gas solidarity mechanism, have both experienced exogenous shocks from the crisis in West Asia, yet have remained steadfast. Under the 1974 Agreement on an International Energy Programme, each of the IEA’s member states hold an obligation to hold oil stocks which would equal to at least 90 days of net oil imports and to stand ready to participate in a collective response. On 11 March, in direct response to the Hormuz crisis, the IEA released 400 million barrels of emergency stocks in a measure of collective action. On a similar count, EU Regulation 2017/1938 as amended, establishes a solidarity mechanism under which, directly connected member states are legally obliged to prioritize supply to protected customers in a neighboring state facing severe gas emergency, over their own non-protected domestic demand, subject to fair compensation. When no bilateral agreement exists, a template annex attached to the regulation is applied, which ensures the agreement continues in full effect. Subsequent amendments post its adoption extended the obligation to LNG-holding states, addressing a similar import diversification as ASEAN. The APSA addresses emergency sharing in principle yet says nothing about the physical and institutional architectures necessary to carry out the program at scale. Two companion initiatives; the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) are yet to be institutionalised.
The APG has been under discussion since 1997. Its most advanced multilateral output remains the Laos PDR-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore corridor, moving 100 megawatts of hydropower, an amount insufficient to meet the regions’ energy demands. ASEAN possesses no singular grid operator, no unified regulator nor a cross-border dispute mechanism. The World Bank’s APGF brief prices the full completion of the project at $800 billion, which is approximately seventeen times the region’s 2025 clean energy investment. This remains the first gap in architecture, lack of ‘Emergency Grid Capacity’
The TAGP faces a parallel failure. Southeast Asia, once a net gas exporter has turned around, into a net importer as domestic demand driven expansion continues to rise. There exists a lack in the capacity for the system to continue domestic production. New LNG terminals are expanding access across various member states, however, greater import terminals do not constitute a connected gas market. Hence, the second gap remains an undelivered ‘Gas market’
Beneath both these projects, sits the APSA’s voluntary commitment structure, which does not force any member state to hold onto a strategic reserve. Hence, here the regional energy safety net is based upon state-to-state goodwill and willingness, rather than a permanent, legal obligation.
Nevertheless, certain theoretical faultlines do stand out when applying the above noted comparisons onto the ASEAN situation. The EU and the IEA are largely cohesive and centralized bodies. ASEAN lacks political-security integration and is largely cooperative on transient, issue-specific cases. However, this does not paralyze the political appetite for change within the APSA. The ASEAN charter offers a sanctioned escape from the need for unanimity and consensus. Article 21(2) of the Charter permits a formula for flexible participation within economic commitments for the organisation within its economic pillar.
The so-called ‘ASEAN Minus X’ rule provides the lack of need for formal ratification and consensus from all states. This was seen with the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism as well as the ASEAN-AU-NZ Free Trade Agreement where Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia acceded later to domestic ratification.
The pathway to apply this procedure to the APSA lies as follows:
Firstly, it must be noted that the APSA sits under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and hence is well within the ambit of Art 21(2) of the Charter. Furthermore, energy security lies at the heart of the ASEAN AEC vision of a well connected and energy sufficient community.
The invocation of the need for Art 21(2) is necessary, by a subset of willing member states. States such as Indonesia, Viet Nam and the Philippines have the largest advantage here as they have the greatest stockpiling needs. These states request the creation of binding commitments while other member states opt out yet do not block the request.
Lastly, the ASEAN Economic Ministers on Energy Cooperation through consensus agree on the opt-out structure. Following which, a binding reserve commitment may be established. An earlier precedent would be the ASEAN+3 Rice Reserve commitment which operates outside the ASEAN 10 framework. The Rice reserve remains a legally binding treaty which is ratified. The issuance of these reserves however, still remains under the ambit of ASEAN consensus.
The case for reform is based upon the comparisons drawn, as well as the contextual gaps showcased. The APSA is a crisis instrument, while the other two instruments are decades away from materializing within the region. However, political appetite for change does exist. Endorsement of a proposal by the Economic Research institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) regarding a joint oil stockpile was successful at the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu. Earlier research from the ERIA has already presented viable models. However, what does remain missing is a binding legal instrument. Hence, three primary policy prescriptions can be provided for the given situation.
Firstly, the commercial, voluntary commitment structure of the APSA should be replaced with a graduated obligation, modelled directly under the IEA’s ninety-day stockpiling rule. Member states with a surplus in production capacity would assume defined, time-limited supply duties once Coordinated Emergency Response Measures (CERM) is activated. This would change the Agreement from a request mechanism to a response framework.
Negotiating an interim, cross-border transmission protocol for the APG would be the most viable solution. A narrower emergency-use protocol with a standing dispute panel and fixed technical standards which are easily replicable would allow pre-existing infrastructure such as the Laos PDR to Singapore corridor to carry out crisis-period trade to meet energy demands in case of an exogenous shock to supply. The APG along with the TAGP failed largely due to lack of political trust as well as no coordinating architecture. The ASEAN Centre for Energy although overlooked these projects yet had no binding authority. The South China Sea dispute further stalls the TAGP: the East Natuna gas field remains contested, and the exit of private operators such as ExxonMobil has made extraction a political and economic hazard.
The creation of a supplemental, binding legal instrument to accede the APSA, or work in accordance with the APSA should be drafted. A boiler-plate bilateral stockpiling agreement as seen in the EU, would remove the bottleneck and create a legal obligation to stockpile and release oil and gas reserves.
The ASEAN’s Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2026-2030 provides the strategic political capital, but lacks the ability to be enforced. According to President Marcos, the Hormuz crisis was a test of a mechanism that “exists and should be tested now, while the crisis is live and the lessons immediate.” Adopted together, these steps would move ASEAN from a voluntary safety net to an enforceable one, before the next shock rather than after it.
Siddhant Ganguli is a Research Assistant at Closed Door Policy Consulting. He is a third-year undergraduate student pursuing a B.A. (Hons.) in Global Affairs at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University. His research interests centre on Southeast Asian studies, international law, maritime geopolitics, and security. He was enrolled in the Closed Door Young Scholars Programme 2025-26.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s).
